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An approach to component certification that is gaining currency is known as
proven in use.
As Giovanni Sartori of Intecs
SpA observes:
"Even given the specific differences in the various domains of safety-related
software (automotive, space, railway, etc.) it is necessary to supply objective
evidence that documents the history of the reused software component.
The evidence can concentrate on the following aspects:
 | The expected Safety Integrity Level for the component |
| The validation process undergone by the component - thus, the test plans
and associated reports |
| Or, data regarding the component being proven in use: in which software
with the same Safety Integrity Level this component has already been used,
which faults it introduced into the system, which hazards the component
creates, what test/verification procedures are necessary to identify the
faults generated by the reused component." |
Currently many organizations, who have enormous stakes in reusing large
systems (including COTS) in new applications, are examining the concept of
"proven in use" in a number of variations. One example is the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) with its interest in using
service history in the certification of reusable software components.
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